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ISSUE PAPER
The Role of a Consumer Harm Test in
Competition Policy
By Adrian Majumdar*
This essay discusses the role of a consumer harm test in
competition policy. First we consider whether consumer surplus is a
better standard than total welfare. Second we consider the
relationship between competition and consumer harm. Finally we
offer concluding remarks.
Consumer Surplus Versus Total Welfare
Most competition authorities pursue a consumer standard -
they seek to deliver an improvement in consumer surplus (i.e. the
difference between what consumers are willing to pay and what they
actually pay, aggregated across all consumers who purchase the good
in question). Under this standard, if improving consumer surplus
reduces profits, those lost profits are not taken into account.
What do economists think about this? Microeconomic
textbooks would imply that we should focus on total welfare, i.e. the
sum of consumer surplus and profits. The standard argument here is
that shareholders are ultimately consumers and so there is no reason
to prefer consumer surplus to profits.
An interesting response to this argument is that pursuing a
consumer standard may actually be better for total welfare.' The
basic idea is that where firms have a choice of many profitable
* I am grateful to Simon Baker and Luke Garrod for comments.
This draws on the insight of Bruce R. Lyons, Could Politicians be More
Right than Economists? A Theory of Merger Standards, (May 15, 2002) (working
paper for Centre for Competition & Regulation) available at
http://www.ccp.uea.ac.uk/publicfiles/workingpapers/ccr02-1 revised.pdf (arguing
that a consumer surplus standard in mergers might be a better way to achieve
improvements in total welfare).
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strategies, a consumer standard may constrain firms to choose the
strategies that are better for total welfare. To see why, consider the
following intuition.
Under a consumer standard, firms pursue profitable strategies
up to the point where consumers are not harmed. If overall profits
rise, while consumer surplus does not fall, total welfare must
increase.2
Under a total welfare standard, firms can go past this point -
they may find that the most profitable permissible strategies are those
that harm consumers a lot (i.e. the very high profits just offset the
loss to consumers). In this case, overall total welfare may hardly
increase at all.
So, paradoxical as it may sound, the consumer standard may
deliver higher total welfare than the total welfare standard. In theory,
therefore, it is not clear that we should prefer one standard over the
other on a priori grounds. This means that the practical application
of each standard is an important consideration. A consumer standard
is easier to administer than a total welfare standard. That is to say,
while measuring whether consumers have been harmed is by no
means easy, measuring consumer harm accurately and then trading
off gains in profits is even harder. So, on balance, the consumer
standard is probably better.
Competition, Consumer Harm, and Their Implications
For Each Other
Our next question is: assuming that the consumer standard is
the right one to pursue, how does this relate to the pursuit of greater
competition? To shed some light on the answer, consider the
following propositions:
oCompetition is generally good for consumers.
oRestrictions in competition may benefit consumers.
oJust because consumers are harmed by the behavior of
one or more firms, does not mean that there is a lack of
competition.
2 Total profits will not necessarily rise. One firm's pursuit of higher profits
may lead to another firm's loss of profits.
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Competition and Consumer Welfare
The first proposition is, at face value, intuitive. If firms are
striving to win customers from their rivals, this benefits consumers
because winning sales from rivals requires offering lower prices or
better products. This intuition carries over (more or less) to the
analysis of unilateral effects. If two firms cease to compete as a
result of a merger, and if that lost competition is material, it is
reasonable to presume that consumers are harmed from the merger
(absent very large efficiency gains). Further, among economists and
policy makers there seems to be (nearly) a consensus as regards the
appropriate empirical and theoretical analyses of: (a) closeness of
competition; (b) barriers to entry and expansion; and (c) strategic
responses by buyers. Therefore, competition authorities are well
placed to protect consumers by focusing on the question of whether
the merger substantially lessens competition.
However, the same cannot be said for the analysis of
exclusionary effects. A particularly difficult area is exclusionary
pricing. Competition policy seeks to protect competition and
thereby, inter alia, to deliver lower prices to consumers. However,
sometimes lower prices lead to harmful exclusionary outcomes
where, for example, they deliver a very good deal to (a certain group
of) consumers in the short term as a means to substantially reducing
competition in the long term.
Recent years have seen the search for the holy grail of
exclusionary behavior, i.e. the answer to the question of how to tell
pro-competitive from anti-competitive low prices.4 The easy route
out is to say the latter lead to consumer harm, while the former lead
to consumer benefits. But at best, that just defers the question to
another stage: how do we identify consumer harm? And at worst, it
3 In theory, the same is true of mergers that give rise to coordinated effects but
in practice it seems easier to rule out the risk of coordinated effects than to
demonstrate their likely existence. With non-horizontal mergers the presumption
should normally be that the merger is pro-competitive since the merger does not
bring together two firms that were competing with each other prior to the merger.
However, where one or both firms merging have market power, it is feasible that
the merger would give rise to exclusionary effects which lead to consumer harm.
Exclusionary behaviour is discussed below.
4 See e.g., European Commission, DG Competition Discussion Paper On The
Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses (Brussels 2005)
available at http://ec.europa.eu/conmi/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper
2005.pdf; and the many responses to it.
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is unhelpful because it could lead practitioners to claim that
exclusionary behavior can be inferred from harm to consumers.
5
To infer exclusionary behavior from harm to consumers is not
the answer. First, often this simply assumes away the problem. For
example, if the issue is whether consumers will be harmed in the
future from a low price set today, we cannot observe harm to
consumers and so the "test" has no power. Second, as we discuss
below, harm to consumers need not be caused by competition
problems and so is not sufficient to invoke intervention under
competition law.
A more satisfactory answer is (a) to set out a clear and
coherent theory of harm to competition and consumers; and (b) to
adduce evidence which supports that theory to a high standard of
proof (notably by demonstrating that the theory of harm is both likely
and far more likely than alternative pro-competitive explanations).
Of course, this still does not tell us how to distinguish between
harmful and beneficial low prices, but at least it gives us a little more
guidance when developing frameworks for the assessment of
exclusionary behavior (in particular screening approaches which rule
out foreclosure at an early stage).6
Dimensions of Competition
Turning to the fact that there are different dimensions of
competition, consider, for example, a case where a vertical agreement
restricts price competition in favor of non-price competition. In this
scenario, a "consumer harm" perspective is helpful in the sense that
we need to ask: (a) which dimension do consumers value most (price
or non-price factors) and (b) is the gain in non-price factors sufficient
to offset the higher prices? That is to say, the consumer harm
approach helps us (in principle) to trade-off opposing effects on
competition.
However, in practice, this is not always an easy task -
especially when one of the dimensions of competition is innovation.
It is well known, for example, that sometimes we need restricted
5 For a related debate regarding whether dominance should be inferred from
evidence of consumer harm, see Adrian Majumdar, Whither Dominance?, 27(4)
EUR. COMPETITION L. REv., 161, (2006).
6 See Fidelity Rebates and Selective Price Cuts, A Report for the Office of Fair
Trading by RBB Economics, July 2005 available at
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comppolicy/oft804.pdf (establishing
both initial screens to rule out foreclosure as well as a framework for addressing the
more complex cases where foreclosure cannot be ruled out at an early stage).
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price competition to deliver greater competition in innovation. If a
firm is considering substantial R&D expenditure, it wants a
reasonable expectation before making the investment that it will
recover its costs. One way is to provide patent or copyright
protection - by allowing a successful innovator to enjoy "monopoly"
profits (protected by intellectual property rights), this should provide
a strong incentive to develop new ideas in the first place. However,
where innovators build on each other's innovations, scope for
exclusionary behavior arises because the refusal to release intellectual
property may delay or even prevent the rival from developing a new
product.
What does the recent CFI judgment on Microsoft say about
this trade-off? 7 In clarifying the European case law on refusal to
supply information, the CFI appears to lower the threshold for
intervention. The released information can be used by a competitor
to develop a differentiated product rather than a genuinely new
product. Arguably, therefore, if a complainant demonstrated that
access to information was indispensable to producing a differentiated
imitation of an innovator's product, and if that imitation would
compete effectively with the innovator's product, then intervention
might be permitted. However, if imitation is too easy, this can harm
incentives to innovate, particularly if the license fee is set too low.
Regulating such fees is difficult and the judgment would appear to
offer little clear guidance on this aspect.
Does the consumer harm principle help us here? Yes and no!
"Yes" in the high-level sense that it should be flexible enough deal
with the problem that intervention to make consumers better today
might reduce their welfare (via lower innovation) tomorrow. And
"No" in the sense that this trade off is very difficult to assess and the
consumer harm principle is too high-level to shed any additional light
on the practical realities of making the correct assessment.
Consumer Protection and Competition Policy
There are disadvantages of having a pure "consumer harm"
test if that would mean that competition authorities could intervene
whenever they observed (or thought they observed) firms engaging in
a practice that harms consumers. That would take their remit beyond
competition policy.
7 Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 WL 2693858 (Sept. 17
2007).
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This is because a bad outcome for consumers does not
necessarily reflect a failing of competition. For example, suppose
that competition means that a product containing a harmful drug is
sold more cheaply than it would have been under monopoly provision
thereby leading to greater consumption of the drug. Absent
consumers being more informed about the drug (or regulation which
restricts the use of that drug), the monopoly may better for consumers
because the higher price means they consume less of the harmful
drug. So if some form of intervention were merited, the appropriate
legislation to use would not be competition law.
The preceding point may sound obvious but the distinction
between competition policy and consumer protection can become
blurred in other scenarios. Consider the following argument: Where
uninformed consumers pay higher prices (because of information
problems), they suffer the same harm (i.e. higher prices) as if they
were served by a monopolist. Therefore competition authorities have
a role to improve consumer information. Indeed, improving
information may facilitate greater competition, since consumers
make better choices.
At face value this does not sound unreasonable (although the
growing literature on bounded rationality indicates that making some
consumers more informed does not always benefit consumer
surplus8). However, while intervention may be merited to improve
consumer awareness - should it proceed under competition law?
For example, the UK Competition Commission is currently
investigating payment protection insurance (PPI).9 One potential
concern is that there is a monopoly at the point of sale of PPI. That is
to say, having sold the consumer a financial product (e.g. a credit
card), the seller immediately has the chance to make a follow on sale
of an insurance product. In that sense, the consumer is captive. But
is that really a monopoly? If it is, then have you been monopolized
when the sommelier in a top restaurant recommends that you choose
a certain wine to accompany your meal and (feeling slightly
pressurized) you agree to take the bottle without asking how much it
costs?
In short, even if there is a good reason to intervene, it is
unhelpful to pretend that monopolies exist when they do not so as to
8 Luke Garrod, Price Transparency and Consumer Naivety in a Competitive
Market (working paper for Centre for Competition & Regulation) (2007) to be
available at http://www.ccp.uea.ac.uk/default.asp?id=workingpapers2007.
9 See UK Competition Commission, at http://www.competition-commission.
org.uk/inquiries/ref2007/ppi/index.htm.
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find a remit for intervention, especially if that would set a precedent
by which firms are found dominant just because they make follow on
sales or sell products that are difficult for consumers fully to
comprehend.
Concluding Remarks
We have argued that competition authorities should adopt a
consumer surplus as opposed to a total welfare standard. Further, in
pursuing that standard, sometimes it will be appropriate to infer
consumer harm from restrictions of competition (e.g. as with mergers
that give rise to unilateral effects). However, in most other cases, the
authorities must consider harm to competition and consumers
together. This applies in particular for exclusionary behavior, where
usually we cannot infer harm to consumers from harm to competition
(either because the latter is hard to identify independently of the
former or because harm to one dimension of competition benefits
rivalry on another). Finally, not all practices that harm consumers
harm competition - in these cases authorities should use different
legislation to intervene and resist the temptation to reverse engineer a
restriction of competition to justify intervention under competition
law.
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